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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction in this matter, pursuant to 
Section 8-2a-3(2)(f) Utah Code, Annotated 1953, as amended. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
(PRESERVATION OF APPEAL ON THE RECORD) 
ISSUE NO. 1 
1st ISSUE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW: 
IS UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-3-402 (3) AN UNCONSTITUTIONAL 
VIOLATION OF THE SEPARATION OF POWERS PRINCIPLE OF 
THE UTAH AND UNITED STATES CONSTITUTIONS? 
A challenge to the constitutionality of a statute is reviewed for correctness 
as a question of law. State v. Kruezer. slip op., Case No. 981035-CA (Utah 
App. Feb. 25,1999). 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-402(3) State v Jones, 689 P.2d 561 (Ariz. App. 
1984); State v Prentiss, 786 P. 2d 932, 935 (Ariz. 1989); State v Dykes, 789 P.2d 
1082 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1990; People v Tenorio, 473 P. 2d 993, 3 Cal. 3d 89, 94 
(Cal. 1970); Estevbar v Municipal Court, 485 P. 2d 1140, 5 Cal. 3d 119 (Cal. 
1971); People v Superior Court, 520 P. 2d 405 (Cal. 1974); In re Inquiry 
Concerning a Judge, 961 P.2d 918 (Utah 1998); In re Inquiry Concerning a 
Judge, 1999 UT 6, 976 P. 2d 581. Preserved for appeal at [R. 619-625]. 
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ISSUE NO. 2 
2na ISSUE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW: 
THE PROOF ESTABLISHED AT TRIAL DOES NOT 
CONSTITUTE A PUBLIC OFFENSE. 
Defendant / Appellant was convicted of Securities Fraud having been 
charged in accordance with Utah Code Ann. § 61-1-1 and 61-1-21 (2) (b) 
(1953, as amended). The evidence at trial was not sufficient to prove, beyond a 
reasonable doubt, that: 
a. the Defendant / Appellant made statements, or failed to disclose, 
in connection with an offering of a security; 
b. the Defendant / Appellant knew of the fraudulent nature of the 
investment plan when he talked to Mr. Sorenson, or when he 
wire transferred the investment money. 
See State v Holgate, 2000 UT 74, 2000.UT.0042150 f 18. 
To determine whether there was sufficient 
evidence to convict a defendant, we do not examine 
whether we believe that the evidence at trial 
established guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Rather, 
we will conclude that the evidence was insufficient 
when, after viewing the evidence and all inferences 
drawn therefrom, in a light most favorable to the jury's 
verdict, the evidence "is sufficiently inconclusive, or 
inherently improbable, that reasonable minds must 
have entertained a reasonable doubt that the defendant 
committed the crime for which he, or she, was 
convicted." State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 1212 (Utah 
1993). 
Quoting State v. Petree, 659 P.2d 443,444 (Utah 1983): We reverse a 
jury conviction, for insufficient evidence, only when the evidence, so viewed, is 
sufficiently inconclusive, or inherently improbable, that reasonable minds must 
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have entertained a reasonable doubt that the defendant committed the crime of 
which he was convicted. State v. Kerekes, Utah, 622 P.2d 1161,1168 (1980); 
State v. Lamm, Utah, 606 P.2d 229, 231 (1980); State v. Gorlick, Utah, 605 P.2d 
761, 762 (1979); State v. Daniels, Utah, 584 P.2d 880, 882-83 (1978); State v. 
Romero, Utah, 554 P.2d 216,219 (1976). Preserved for appeal at [R. 550-553]. 
ISSUE NO. 3 
3rd ISSUE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW: 
PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT OCCURRED IN THE 
PRESENCE OF THE JURY AND DURING THE TRIAL WHEN: 
a. the lead Prosecutor asked Marc Sorenson whether Mr. Walker 
told him whether he had ever been convicted of a felony when 
the prosecutor knew there had been no such conviction; [R.489, 
p. 98,11. 14-16] 
b. the Prosecutor argued the Defendant's conviction, permanent 
injunction, and sentence to prison, to show that Lee Walker was 
a bad person, and therefore, guilty of the crimes charged herein. 
[R. 495, p.48,11. 23-25, p. 49,11. 1-3] 
c. during closing argument, the lead Prosecutor told the Jury that 
Defendant / Appellant, Lee Walker, had been sentenced to 
prison; a fact not in evidence. [R. 495, p.48,49] 
Information concerning those items had been admitted into 
evidence for the sole purpose of establishing an element of securities fraud. 
We review rulings on motions for a mistrial based on prosecutorial 
misconduct for abuse of discretion. See State v. Hay, 859 P.2d 1, 6 (Utah 
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1993). Preserved Joi appeal ;il |K -low p 48,49] [R. 488 p.146]. [R. 489 p. 
98,11.14-15] 
ISSUE NO. 4 
4th ISSUE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW: 
JURY INSTRUCTION NO. 13 G DID NOT PROVIDE FOR V 
UNANIMITY ON AN ELEMENT OF i URITIES 
FRAUD AND THl ro COMMIT ERROR. 
I )m' pmcess ch - - i- '.niestions of law that we review applying a 
correction of error standard. See Tolman v. Salt Lake County Attorney, 818 
P.2d 23, 28 (Utah Ct. App. 1991), Fourteenth Amendment to the United 
States Constitution, and article I, sections 7 and 24, of the Utah Constitution. 
Preserved for appeal at [R.544 540J [K .V>2 ((V II | 
ISSUE NO #5 
5 ra ISSUE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW: 
THERE WAS ERROR IN THE METHOD USED IN SELECTING AND 
SEATING THE JUR\ MM) Nil UTERNATI,. 
There was error in the "disqualification" <>1 JMMH NO <> State vBates 61 
p 905 22 Ut 65 (1900) unlawful jury a nullity. 
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In the instant case, the Court arbitrarily removed Juror No. 6 and 
substituted the alternate, who had been seated as Juror No. 9. [R.424] The 
defendant voiced a timely and specific objection to this process. 
On appeal, an appellant has the burden of establishing that reversible error 
resulted from an abuse of discretion during the jury selection process. State v. 
Bishop, 753 P.2d 439, 448 (Utah 1988). Preserved for appeal at [R. 490, p.567, 
568]. 
STATUTES, RULES AND CONSTITUTIONAL ITEMS 
SEE ADDENDUM 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-402, 1-5-6-48 
Utah Code Ann. §76-3-402(3) 1-5-6-48 
United States Constitution, Fourteenth Amendment 4 -5 
Utah Constitution article I, sections 7 and 24 4-5-6. 
Section 10 (b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 
[15 U.S.C. § 78 j (b)] Rule 10b-5 [17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5] 6 
UtahR. Crim. P. 17(h). 5-44 
Utah R. Crim. P. 18(a), (0- 5-46 
Utah R. Crim. P. 18(a), (t) 5-45. 
UtahR. Crim. P. 18(d) 5-45 
Utah R. Crim. P. 18(g) 4-5-46-47 
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Utah Code Ann. §61-1-1 and <> I I JI (..!) (l>)(1953, as amended). 19 
Utah < VUJ ^ivi.), ^ amended). 5-6-7 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
On October 21, 1998, a jury found the Defendant guilty of Securities Fraud 
and Money Laundering, both felonies. J i i' W, the < 'ouri stayed 
imposition of sentence and placed Defendant on 36 months supervised probation 
with I I he delendnnt would pn\ restitution of one hundred thousand 
dollars ($100,000.00), jointly and severally, with all other defendants. Payment 
wns placed in ibevanee pending trial and sentencing of co-defendants. 
On August 31, 2000, the Defendant filed a MOTION t0 "Fntei Con\ lei ion, 
Pin siunl to IJCA 76-3-402, and to Terminate Probation," and requested the 
Court reduce Defendant's convictions two degrees, pursuant lo I Hah ( ode Ann. 
§ 76-3-402, and reset the amount of restitution at $5000.00. 
The Court, after considering all ih< Milium,1111m available eloquently 
expressed the desire to reduce the degree of offense by two degrees. The 
Plaintifl did not ',enoii\l\ disagree but refused to consent to a reduction of more 
than one degree. Plaintiffs consent is necessary to reduce a second degree 
under Ihe movisions of Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-402(3). 
Defendant's request for a finding of unconsdi ni lonahtv ofthai seelionol die 
Utah code was favorably received by the Court, which was persuaded by 
Arizona and California cases lli.il ihr < IUIII, ilsell, Ihnuigh Us t>wn resources, 
researched and cited, which had held similar statutes to be unconstitutional. 
Howevvi iin.ibk' tu find sinnlai precedents in Utah, the Court declined to hold 
that Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-402(3) is an unconstitutional violation of the 
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principle of separation of powers. Yet the Court encouraged Defendant to 
appeal this issue to obtain a definitive decision.. 
Consequently, this Court declines to hold that Utah Code 
Ann. §76-3-402 is an unconstitutional violation of the separation of 
powers principle, but encourages Defendant to appeal this issue to 
obtain a definitive decision. [R. 623] 
FACTS OF THE CASE 
Dr. Mark Sorenson, former owner of a wellness spa in Ivins, Utah, is the 
investor and complainant in this case and a friend of Lance Hatch. David Orr, 
also a Southern Utah Resident, is an investor, and a friend of Lance Hatch. 
Lance Hatch is a former chiropractor, turned investment counselor, and David 
Smith is an investment counselor from Florida. Steven Taggart is the Division 
Director of Securities for the State of Utah. Bear Stearns operates the Bear 
Stearns Securities Corp.'s Prime Broker Services, whose clients include hedge 
funds, money managers, arbitrageurs, market makers, specialists, and other 
professional investors trading at multiple securities firms. Fazia and Idsa are 
people in New York who received, and gave a receipt for, $50,000.00 of 
Sorenson's investment capital. Wallid Z. Suma is the client referred to in the 
Memorandum of Understandings, (Exhibit #1 and Exhibit #2), who lives in 
Southfield, Michigan, but hails from a foreign country. Lee Walker was a 
practicing attorney in Las Vegas, Nevada. 
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200inm?-rA 
Dr. Mark Sorenson, neighbor and home teacher to Lance Hatch, was 
doing a home visit to Hatch's residence on a Sunday, on, or about, October 13 
or 14th, 1994. Afterwards, in a friendly conversation, Sorenson inquired of 
Hatch what he had been doing since having left his chiropractic practice. Hatch 
responded that he was studying to be a financial investor, or financial counselor. 
In the course of this conversation, Hatch volunteered that he had come across 
something that seemed very lucrative, which had the potential yield of a 
$275,000.00 return on a $100,000.00 investment. That got Sorenson's interest. 
Sorenson later stated, he did not think Hatch knew he had money to invest, and 
responded with,"... hey, that sounds interesting, Lance, tell me more." [R. 489, 
p. 49,11. 1-19]. 
Dr. Sorenson advised that his memory was sketchy, but he remembered 
prime bank instruments being mentioned. Lance told him about a wealthy man, 
named Wallid Summa, living in Michigan, but from a foreign country. 
According to Hatch, Wallid Summa wanted to transfer one billion dollars into 
Bear Stearns (sic) from an unknown point of origination, "...and he had sales, I 
guess, for these instruments afterwards." [R. 489, p50,11. 16-25] 
Sorenson's understanding was that, "...it could not be legally done unless 
there was an account outside of Bear Stearns Company." He was told this by 
Lance Hatch, who gave him his basic, overall understanding of the deal; at least, 
Walker Brief Page 8 of48 
that was his memory of what he was told at that time. [R. 489, p51,11. 1-25, p. 
64,11. 24-25, p. 65,11. 1-25, p. 66,11. 1-25, p. 66,11. 1-25, p. 67,11. 1-23] 
Hatch told him that the return would be very, very high, and that Hatch wished 
he had the money to go into something like that, himself. At this point, 
Sorenson said, "I've got some money to invest, can you tell me more, or get me 
in touch with these people, and see if I can get in on this?" [R. 489, p.52,11. 4-7] 
Sorenson next talked to either Lee Walker, or David Smith. His best 
guess was that he talked to Walker, that same day, or the next day. [R. 489, p. 
53,11. 12-13,23-25]. Lance Hatch got on one phone in his house and Sorenson 
got on an extension phone. [R. 489, p. 54,11. 10-12] Lance Hatch dialed up a 
phone number and they talked to someone on the other end who identified 
himself as Lee Walker. [R. 489, p. 55,11. 1-4] Sorenson did not "...recall 
talking too much about exactly how the investment was going to work." [R. 
489, p. 55,11. 15-17] 
The main substance of that conversation was Walker telling Sorenson that 
Mr. Smith was a good guy and that Smith had done these things before. He 
could vouch for Smith's credibility. [R. 489, p. 56,11. 16-18] [R. 489, p. 101,11. 
9-15, p. 102,11. 2-6,19-25, p. 102,11. 1, p. 113,11. 1-11] Sorenson assumed an 
understanding that things Walker was talking were about prime bank 
instruments. [R 489, p. 56,11. 22-24] [R. 489, p. 102,11. 19-25, p. 102,11. 1] 
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This was the only conversation Snunsi'ii lu I v.illi \\ .ilki.i ullu:i l>y phone, or 
in person.
 tk. itv, p. ^,,u. -*-uJ 
Subsequently, Sorenson had conversations with Smith, by phone ) 
gavu i.iii. -. • iT-•information about the investment, not all of whiw. 
undersi . , «3J [R. 489, p.107,11.10-20] 
T - oianuuii Understanding, Lxlnbit # S l,was 
faxed to L;/ . *• ! . •••;: sorenson did not 
remember the source of the second Memoranr i . n 
57,11. 17-20], nor did he know who faxed the first Memorandum v « e 
! Liu ii | K -189. p 58,11. 1-3] Sorenson had a limited discussion with Lance 
me they read through the Memorandum; it looked good to them 
: iendous <.• A return. Lance did mention thai he had worked 
with Lee Walker and that T (i, W.ill 11 w u n li riiiuiate gin llatchhad 
been Walker's chiropractor and he said that Walkei had nlw:n . |i n<l In mi 
time and such, and that he thought that Lee Walker was an "upright person 
4K'J,|,.SN. II J l | 
aoranaum ot Understanding, Sorenson transferred 
$100,000.00, via \ ; uorney trust account in Las 
Vegas, Nevada |R 489
 V- *S H 22 2* ~ *•> \ 
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o n n m n n r* \ 
Sorenson did not know, or remember, how he got the necessary 
transmittal information for the transfer of funds into Walker's trust account. [R. 
489, p. 59,11. 16-25] Lance Hatch had suggested the money be sent to Walker's 
trust account".. .to hold his (Walker's) feet to the fire" for the purpose of 
"...making sure that Lee was involved in the transaction." [R. 489, p. 60,11. 4-
12] Sorenson did not receive acknowledgement from Lee Walker, at the time of 
the wire transfer, but did receive acknowledgement, and a receipt, from Xavier 
Fazio and David Freedman, of New York, for $50,000.00 of his investment. 
[R.489,p. 61,11. 1-16] 
When the scheduled payments did not come through, Sorenson contacted 
David Smith, Lance Hatch, and tried to contact Lee Walker. His reasoned 
choice to call Walker was that there was where he had sent the money. [R.489, 
p. 63,11. 17-19] 
Lance Hatch had known Walker for several years. They had met, 
socially, and had done some things together, including a network marketing 
company dealing in herbs and herbal remedies. [R. 488, p.221,11. 8-11, 18-22] 
Lance Hatch testified that Lee Walker had introduced him to the Memorandum 
of Understanding in October, 1994. [R.488, p. 215,11. 18-20, p.216,11. 10-11]. 
Walker faxed it to him [R. 488, p. 216,11. 16] and had advised that this was 
something viable and could be shown to interested parties. [R. 488, 217,11. 22-
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25] Walker indicated the Memorandum had come from David Smith, in Florida, 
a client of his of 10 or 11 months, who, he thought, was honest and upright. [R. 
488, p.218,11. 20-25] 
Lance Hatch stated that he first discussed the Memorandum of 
Understanding with Dr. Sorenson, at Lance Hatch's house, on a Sunday in 
October 1994. [R. 488, p. 222,11. 5-10] They were discussing various things at 
that time and Sorenson stated that he had money and was disappointed with the 
return that he was making on his money. Hatch told him he had the Memoranda 
that had been sent to him, if Sorenson wanted to look at it. [R. 488, p.223,11. 
16-24] Hatch's testimony is confusing in that he stated that, after discussing 
the memorandum with Sorenson, "We ... talked to Mr. Walker, who indicated 
we could call Smith." [R. 488, p. 224,11. 8-24] He believed that only he and 
Walker spoke at this time, and that, sometime later, a conference call occurred 
between Sorenson, Hatch and Smith, and, he believed, Mr. Walker. [R.488, p. 
225,11. 10-14] Hatch could not remember if Sorenson was in his home during 
the conversation. [R. 488, p225,11. 15-25] Hatch said that there was an 
urgency to get the money into these accounts and stated that both Smith and 
Walker had conveyed that urgency to him. He blamed this urgency for 
precluding any further checking into the validity of this investment. [R. 488, p. 
226,11. 21-25, p. 227,11. 1-11]. Subsequently, Hatch recollected a three way 
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conversation with Sorenson and Walker, originating from his home, in October, 
which was the only conversation with Walker before Sorenson invested his 
funds. He said that they reviewed the Memorandum and discussed whether this 
was a legal investment, and so forth. [R 488, p. 227,11. 12-25, p. 228,11. 1-17] 
Hatch responds to the question on direct at [R. 488, p.229,11. 18-25, p. 230,11. 
1-5]: 
18 During this conversation what was 
19 Mr. Walker's response to your inquiries? 
20 A. Well, the gist of the response was once 
21 again that he had known Mr. Smith for nearly a year 
22 as a client and that in his opinion Mr. Smith was 
23 upstanding and that this was probably a, a viable 
24 situation. That this investment was okay. That 
25 was the gist of it. You know, it went on. They 
PENNY C. ABBOTT, COURT REPORTER [R. 488] PAGE 229 
1 were, they were long conversations. 
2 Q. Were there— Did, did you have any 
3 further conversations with Mr. Walker prior to 
4 Dr. Sorenson investing? 
5 A. I don't believe so. 
PENNY C. ABBOTT, COURT REPORTER 
a portion of PAGE 230 
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Hatch then stated that he suggested that Sorenson send the money to 
Walker's attorney's trust account, which would put Walker in the position of 
having to make sure that everything was handled correctly. [R. 488, p. 231,11. 
1-17]. Hatch testified that he was not aware of Exhibit 6, a permanent 
injunction against Lee Walker, enjoining him from engaging in any act, practice, 
or courts of business which operates, or would operate, as a fraud or deceit upon 
any person, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security, in violation 
of Section 10 (b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 [15 U.S.C. § 78 j (b)] 
and Rule 10b-5 [17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5], there under. Nor was he aware of a 
conviction of criminal contempt per Exhibit #7. Hatch testified that he would 
certainly have thought it necessary to bring those items to Dr. Sorenson's 
attention. [R. 488, p. 232,11. 17-25, p. 233, p. 234,11. 1-21] He denied any 
knowledge of what had happened to Dr. Sorenson's money after he made the 
initial investment. [R.488, p. 233,11. 23-25] 
On cross examination, Hatch admitted that Walker did not tell him he had 
any experience with Smith, involving Prime Bank Instruments, referred to in the 
Memorandum of Understanding, and that he did recommend investments in 
these Memorandum of Understanding as a good idea. [R. 488, p. 239,11. 8-25, 
p. 24011.1-5] 
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He testified about lengthy discussions he and Sorenson had had with 
David Smith and that Smith's only reference to Walker was that he was his 
attorney. He did not remember if he had said he was his attorney in connection 
with this investment program. [488, p. 242-243,] Smith did not suggest, to 
either Sorenson or Hatch, that the money be forwarded through Walker, but 
indicated that he didn't care, so long as the money would wind up in the bank 
accounts specified in the Memorandum of Understanding. [488, p. 244, 5-17] 
He did not advise Walker that he had had Sorenson forward the money to him to 
".. .put him (Walker) on the hook." He had been informed, by Walker, that the 
nature of his (Walker's) research was solely his trust in David Smith. [R 488, p. 
246,11. 20-25, p. 247,11. 1-12] 
Steven Taggart, of the Utah Securities Commission, a witness for the 
prosecution, testified that both the Legal Injunction, and the conviction for 
contempt items, as referenced by exhibits 6 and 7, regarding the Defendant, Lee 
Walker, would have to be disclosed by Walker, if he was recommending a 
security to a potential investor. [R.488, p. 285-286] 
The witness Herbert A Biera, a senior official at the Federal Reserve 
Board in Washington, D.C. with the title of Associate Director in the Division of 
Banking Supervision and Regulation testified as an expert [R490, p.467-483] 
and stated : "There's no such thing (prime bank instruments) and any use of 
them would be illegitimate and fraudulent." [R. 490, p. 477,11. 21-23 
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When Mr. Biern was given Exhibit #2 to examine and asked by the 
prosecutor: 
Q. "In your opinion is the transaction that's described in that memorandum a 
fraudulent transaction?" 
A. "Absolutely." 
Q. "Is it fair to say that that memorandum describes a fraud on its face?" 
A. "Absolutely" 
[R490,p.478,11.8-15] 
Joseph Matthew Jenkins, a certified public accountant and assistant 
director at the Securities Division of Utah in charge of the licensing, auditing 
and some investigatorial (sic) with the broker-dealers testified, as an expert in 
accounting issues [488, p. 299- 318]and on the money trail of Dr. Sorenson's 
One hundred thousand dollar ($100,000.00) investment. 
He reviews wire transfers from Sorenson's Mountain America Credit 
Union, bank records from Lee Walker's First Interstate Bank account, records 
from Palm Beach National Bank account of David B. Smith records of Bear 
Stearns regarding Mercantile Investments and sales invoices from Stewart G. 
Eagle. In the course of his investigation he determined that on October 18, 1994 
Mark Sorenson wired $100,000.00 to Lee Walkers trust account, which arrived 
that same date, bringing the balance total of that account to 102,996.99. 
That same day, pursuant to the accompanying instructions, $50,000.00 
was wired to David B. Smith's account at Palm National Bank and then 
$50,000.00 was wired to Bear Stearns for and on behalf of Mercantile 
Investments. He was unable to determine what happened to the money that 
went to Bear Stearns as there records were a "little bit" incomplete. [R. 490, 
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p.301,11. 4-25, p. 302,11. 8-19] 
The money that went to the Smith account mad the balance there to 
balance to $50,000.00. On October 19th 1994 he purchased a Jeep for 
$34,782.95, wrote a check to Sea Land Realty for a mortgage for $6500.00. On 
that same day he received $2,050 in cash. There were other small amounts and 
a bank charge. 
His investigation developed that Lee Walker received no benefit from the 
Sorenson funds, via the front door, or the back door. [R .490, p. 311,11. 10-20] 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENTS 
ISSUE NO. 1 
At sentencing the Defendant / Appellant moved for a double reduction of 
sentence. The Court was favorably disposed to grant same but under Utah Code 
Ann. §76-3-402(3) the Prosecuting Attorney is required to agree before granting 
of the second reduction and declined to so do. Defendant / Appellant appeals 
this as a conflict of the separation of powers inherent in the Utah Judicial 
system. Utah Code Ann. §76-3-402 is an unconstitutional violation of the 
separation of powers principle. 
ISSUE NO. 2 
Defendant / Appellant was convicted of Securities Fraud having been 
charged in accordance with Utah Code Ann. § 61-1-1 and 61-1-21 (2) (b) 
(1953, as amended). The evidence at trial was not sufficient to prove that 
beyond a reasonable doubt in that it did not support the elements of the crime. 
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ISSUE NO. 3 
The lead prosecutor asked Marc Sorenson whether Mr. Walker had told him 
whether he had ever been convicted of a felony when the prosecutor knew there 
had been no such conviction; argued the Defendant's previous conviction, 
permanent injunction, and sentence to prison. Information concerning those 
items had been admitted into evidence for the sole purpose of establishing an 
element of securities fraud; [R.495, p.48,11. 23-25, p.49,11.1-3] and during 
closing argument, the lead prosecutor told the Jury that Defendant / Appellant, 
Lee Walker, had been sentenced to prison, a fact not in evidence. [R. 495, p49, 
11. 2-3] 
ISSUE NO. 4 
Jury instruction no. 13 g did not provide for jury unanimity on an element 
of the crime of securities fraud and thus invited the jury to commit error. 
ISSUE NO. 5 
There was error in the method used in selecting and seating the jury and the 
alternate. There was error in the "disqualification" of juror no. 6. The Court 
arbitrarily removed Juror No. 6 and substituted the Alternate Juror, who had 
been seated as Juror No. 9. [R. 424] 
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ARGUMENT OF ISSUES 
ARGUMENT ISSUE NO. 1 
REDUCTION OF CONVICTIONS Utah Code Ann. §76-3-402(3) 
In rendering the Trial Court's Memorandum Decision, [R.619-625] Judge 
G. Rand Beacham stated, on page 2 [R. 620], under the heading REDUCTION 
OF CONVICTIONS: 
At Defendant's sentencing hearing, this Court expressed its 
findings as to Defendant's culpability in comparison with other 
persons involved in the events which led to Defendant's 
convictions. Considering the nature and circumstances of 
Defendant's offenses, this Court still finds that Defendant has the 
least culpability of any of those persons involved in the illegal 
transactions, and still finds that Defendant received no profit, or 
benefit, from the illegal transactions. The only co-defendant who 
was charged in this jurisdiction, David Smith, has never reached the 
trial of his charges, even though his alleged culpability is much 
greater than Defendant's; after several delays due to changes in 
Smith's legal counsel, the trial scheduled earlier this month was 
again continued due to the hospitalization of Smith's appointed 
attorney. Consequently, Defendant has been convicted and has 
served nearly two years of probation, while his co-defendant still 
awaits trial. This Court also finds that Defendant's history and 
character, though not as spotless as might be hoped, are such that 
[R. 620] his motion should be seriously considered. Having 
considered all the information available, this Court concludes that it 
would be unduly harsh to record Defendant's convictions for the 
degree of offense established by statute. To this extent, Plaintiff 
does not seriously disagree. 
Plaintiff refuses to consent to a reduction of more than one 
degree, however. Plaintiffs consent is necessary for a reduction of 
Defendant's offenses to misdemeanors, under the provisions of 
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Utah Code Ann. §76-3-402(3), which pmv ides an offense may be 
reduced only one degree under this section, unless the prosecutor 
specifically agrees in writing, or on the court record, that the 
offense may be reduced two degrees. In no case may an offense be 
reduced, under this section, by more than two degrees. 
Defendant asks this Court to find that this statute violates the 
constitutional principle of separation of powers, by allowing the 
prosecutor, who serves in the executive branch of government, to 
control a judicial decision about sentencing. This argument has a 
superficial appeal, because this Court would, in fact, order the 
reduction of Defendant's convictions to class a misdemeanors, but 
for the prosecutor's refusal to consent. Defendant provided the 
Court with only a cursory argument in support of his motion, 
however, and cited no specific precedent. Plaintiff simply argued 
that the statute should be respected, but has cited only non-
controlling precedents on somewhat related issues. 
Upon consideration of Defendant's motion, this Court 
assigned its law clerk to research the issue. There appears to be no 
controlling precedent in this State, but the law clerk has identified 
several decisions, from sister states, which bear on the issue. In the 
view of this Court, the best reasoning comes from Arizona and 
California, which have both held that a statute, which requires the 
prosecutor's assent before an offense is reduced, does violate the 
separation of powers doctrine. In [R621] State v. Jones 689 P. 2d 
561 (Ariz. App. 1984), the Arizona Court of Appeals held that the 
Legislature 
cannot give the prosecuting attorney, after a 
conviction, [the power] to decide what the 
punishment shall be. That is a judicial function. 
[Arizona statute] was enacted to mitigate the 
punishment prescribed by §28-692.01(B) and 
the decision to mitigate a sentence properly 
belongs to the judge and not to the prosecutor. 
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Further, in State v. Prentiss 786 P.2d 932 (Ariz. 1989), the 
Arizona Supreme Court upheld Jones, stating that Jones made it 
clear that it is unconstitutional to limit a judge's ability to impose a 
mitigated sentence to instances in which the prosecutor makes a 
post-trial "recommendation." They stated: "The cornerstone upon 
which Jones is predicated is that the legislature cannot, through an 
executive agent, restrict the judiciary from deciding what a 
sentence should be." Id. at 935. 
The Arizona court recognized that a prosecutor has complete 
discretion in deciding what charge to bring, but held that "once the 
legislature provides the court with the power to use sentencing 
discretion, the legislature cannot then limit the court's exercise of 
discretion by empowering the executive branch to review that 
discretion." See also, State v. Dykes 789 P.2d 1082 (Ariz. Ct. App. 
1990) (requiring motion by prosecutor, before judge could apply 
lesser sentence, unconstitutionally violates the separation of powers 
doctrine). 
In California, the courts have mainly focused on the fact that, 
although prosecutors have discretion to determine what crime to 
charge, that is the extent of their discretion. They do not hold the 
same power after a conviction has been obtained. In People v. 
Tenorio 473 P.2d 993, 3 Cal.3d 89 (Cal. 1970), the California 
Supreme Court addressed a statutory provision which gave the 
district attorney the power to preclude a trial court from exercising 
its discretion to strike a prior offense for [R. 622] the purposes of 
sentencing. In that setting, in which the district attorney's "veto" 
power was exercised at the sentencing phase, well after the filing of 
the charges, the court concluded that such an exercise violated the 
separation of powers doctrine. The court explained: 
The judicial power is compromised when a judge, who 
believes that a charge should be dismissed in the 
interests of justice, wishes to exercise the power to 
dismiss but finds that before he may do so he must 
bargain with the prosecutor. The judicial power must 
be independent, and a Judge should never be required 
to pay for its exercise. 
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Tenorio 3 Cal.3d at 94. See also, Esteybar v. Municipal 
Court 485 P.2d 1140, 5 Cal. 3d 119 (Cal. 1971); Davis v. Municipal 
C 757 P.2d 11 (Cal. 1988) (following Tenorio and Esteybar); 
People v. Superior Court 520 P.2d 405 (Cal. 1974) (striking down 
statute giving prosecutor veto power over trial court's decision to 
sentence defendant to diversion program). 
This Court finds the reasoning in the Arizona and California 
cases to be very sound and persuasive. There is no similar 
precedent in Utah, however. Furthermore, the state of the principle 
of separation of powers in Utah is, to this Court, impossible to 
assess. The competing decisions of the Utah Supreme Court in In re 
Inquiry Concerning a Judge 961 P.2d 918 (Utah 1998) and In re 
Inquiry Concerning a Judge 1999 UT 6, 976 P.2d 581 have left this 
Court with serious doubt as to the viability of the separation of 
powers principle. Finally, decisions as to the constitutionality of 
statutes are generally appropriate and meaningful only in the 
appellate courts. 
Consequently, this Court declines to hold that Utah Code 
Ann. §76-3-402 is an unconstitutional violation of the separation of 
powers principle, but encourages Defendant to «npeal this issue to 
obtain a definitive decision. [R. 623] 
Conference on Judicial Independence and Accountability 
Judicial independence and accountability are two principles essential to 
our system of governmeiil 1'U |ni'U. iplo air under^ om ,^ examination and 
challenge after two centuries of quiet acceptance. The following materials were 
principally gathered at the University of Southern California Conference on 
Judicial Independence and Accountability held November 20-21. 1998. 
I. Institutional independence is not the same as decisional independence. 
Walker Brief Page 22 of 48 
r\ f\ f\ 1 fX i \ -I '-% *~i A 
The organization of the judiciary and its relationships to the other 
branches of government are its structural features. Structural independence may, 
but does not necessarily, affect the decisional independence of judges. We often 
speak of independence generally, while the concern is for decisional 
independence. As a judge considers an individual case, decisional independence 
enables full and complete neutrality. This appears to be more a function of the 
judge and her approach rather than depending upon structural realities. 
1. Judicial independence and accountability protect the Rule of Law. 
The Rule of Law is the foundation of an ordered society. If the judiciary is 
subject to immediate control by the king, legislature or populace, 
decisions may be made in response to that pressure rather than according 
to the Rule of Law. On the other hand, an ungoverned judiciary may 
depart from the Rule of Law without fear of consequence. Independence 
and accountability protect the Rule of Law. 
No Branch of Government May Have Unlimited Power 
Madison argued in Federalist 47 that "the accumulation of all powers 
legislative, executive and judiciary in the same hands, whether of one a few or 
the many . . . may justly be called the very definition of tyranny." John Ferejohn, 
Dynamics of Judicial Independence: Independent Judges, Dependent Judiciary, 
Page 9. 
The Concept of "Constitutionality" Requires an Independent Judiciary 
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The need for judicial independence arises in a constitutional government 
where only those laws that are constitutionally legitimate ought to be enforced. 
Courts must be able to do much of the work in deciding which laws survive this 
test. A/at 14. 
What Incursions on Judicial Independence Matter? 
The threats to judicial independence, in order to be real, must: 
1. have reason to get a judge or court to reach a decision on grounds 
irrelevant to law; 
2. have sufficient resources - political, social and/or economic 
influence or intimidate the judge; 
3. be capable of forming a will or intention to act in way that 
interferes with judicial independence. Id at 18 
Therefore, Defendant respectfully requests that this Court review this 
issue and consider how it pertains to the principle of the separation of powers in 
the Utah Judiciary. 
ARGUMENT ISSUE NO. 2 
EVIDENCE AT TRIAL WAS INSUFFICIENT TO PROVE GUILT 
BEYOND A REASONABLE DOUBT 
Defendant / Appellant was convicted of Securities Fraud having been 
charged in accordance with Utah Code Ann. § 61-1-1 and 61-1-21 (2) (b) 
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(1953, as amended). The evidence at trial was not sufficient to prove beyond a 
reasonable doubt that: 
a. the Defendant / Appellant made statements, or failed to disclose, in 
connection with an offering of a security; 
b. that the Defendant / Appellant knew of the fraudulent nature of 
the investment plan when he talked to Mr. Sorenson, or when he 
wire transferred the investment money. 
See State v Holgate, 2000 UT 74, 2000.UT.0042150 f 18. 
To determine whether there was sufficient 
evidence to convict a defendant, we do not examine 
whether we believe that the evidence at trial 
established guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Rather, 
we will conclude that the evidence was insufficient 
when, after viewing the evidence and all inferences 
drawn therefrom, in a light most favorable to the jury's 
verdict, the evidence "is sufficiently inconclusive, or 
inherently improbable, that reasonable minds must 
have entertained a reasonable doubt that the defendant 
committed the crime for which he, or she, was 
convicted." State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201,1212 (Utah 
1993). 
In State v Larsen, 865 P. 2d 1355 (Utah 1993), the Court held that a 
person violated § 61—1—(2) only if that person acts "willfully." Id at 1358. 
Furthermore, UCA 61-1-21 specifies "willfulness" as the culpable state of 
mind. The trial transcript reveals that Mr. Walker did not willfully violate the 
law. Defendant's / Appellant's only representation was that he knew Smith and 
believed him to be credible. [R. 489, p. 102, p. 103,11. 1-14, p. 113,11. 1-22] 
Defendant's / Appellant's omission to reveal a prior securities conviction was 
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immaterial, because his involvement was not of a nature that created a duty to so 
divulge. It is "inherently improbable' that, on the basis of a single pre-
investment phone call, lasting from five to eight minutes, between Defendant / 
Appellant and Sorenson, the elements of a public offense are proven to exist 
beyond reasonable doubt. [R. 489, p. 113,11. 1-22] 
In Fibro Trust, Inc. v Brahman Financial Inc., 91A P. 2d 288,199 UT 13, 
362 Utah Adv. Rep. 15 (Utah 2/12/99), the Court followed the same line of 
reasoning as in the Larson case and came to the conclusion that proof of a 
violation of either sections 61-1-1 (3), or 61-1-1 (1), also requires proof that 
the person willfully engaged in the prohibited conduct. Applying the "willful" 
mental state to prohibited conduct should amount to a requirement that there be 
some evidence of a deliberate, purposeful act, which is distinguishable from 
behavior which is accidental or inadvertent. 
Matters involving securities law are often times very complicated and 
difficult for jurors to understand. There was, in this trial, considerable testimony 
about the nature of the investment; i.e. "Prime Bank Note case". That 
testimony was given by the State's expert witnesses to the effect that "Prime 
Bank Notes" simply didn't exist and were fraudulent vehicles. [R.490, p. 477,11. 
21-23] That sort of testimony was not directed at Defendant / Appellant, but 
had to do with the investment vehicle itself. Nevertheless, the substance of the 
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testimony was likely confusing and of such a nature that a juror could reach the 
errant conclusion and assume Defendant / Appellant's culpability. The notion of 
reasonable doubt could become very, very clouded in a juror's mind. 
Include in that mixture the significant prejudice, created by statements to 
the jury, by the lead prosecutor, and the concept of reasonable doubt goes up in 
smoke. 
For example, during trial, the prosecutor improperly brought matters before 
the jury that had the sole effect of arousing undue prejudice against the 
Defendant, to wit: 
At trial, the lead prosecutor asked Marc Sorenson whether Mr. Walker had 
told him whether he had ever been convicted of a felony. The prosecutor asked 
that question knowing Mr. Walker had not been convicted of a felony. [R. 489, 
p. 98.11. 14-16] 
a. The prosecutor argued the Defendant's conviction, the permanent 
injunction, and the sentence to prison, to show that Lee Walker was a bad 
person, and therefore, guilty of the crimes charged herein when those 
items had been admitted into evidence for the sole purpose of establishing 
an element of securities fraud. [R. 495, p. 48,11. 23-25, p. 49,11. 1-3] 
b. During closing argument, the lead prosecutor told the jury that the 
Defendant / Appellant, Lee Walker, had been sentenced to prison. [R. 
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495, p.48,49] That fact was not in evidence and was unduly prejudicial 
against Defendant / Appellant. 
These statements, by the Prosecutor, denied Defendant / Appellant, Lee 
Walker, a fair trial and due process of law. 
It is fundamental, in our law, that a person may be 
convicted criminally only for his acts; not for his 
general character. That principle is violated if a 
conviction is based on an inference that conviction is justified because of the defendant's criminal character, 
or propensity to commit bad acts. The admission of 
evidence of prior crimes may have such a powerful 
tendency to mislead the finder of fact as to subvert the 
constitutional principle that a defendant may be 
convicted only if guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of a 
specific crime charged. State v. Saunders 992 P.2d 951 
(Utah, 1999) (emphasis added). 
Defendant / Appellant, Lee Walker, was also convicted of Money 
Laundering, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-1903 (1953, as amended). 
§ 76-10-1903 provides, in pertinent part, as follows: 
76-10-1903. Money laundering. 
(1) A person commits the offense of money laundering who: 
(a) transports, receives, or acquires the property, which is in fact 
proceeds of the specified unlawful activity, knowing that the property 
involved represents the proceeds of some form of unlawful activity; 
(b) makes proceeds of unlawful activity available to another by 
transaction, or transportation, or other means, knowing that it is intended 
to be used for the purpose of continuing, or furthering, the commission of 
specified unlawful activity; 
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(c) conducts a transaction knowing that property involved in the 
transaction represents the proceeds of some form of unlawful activity with 
the intent: 
(i) to promote the unlawful activity; 
(ii) to conceal or disguise the nature, location, source, 
ownership, or control of the property; 
(iii) to avoid a transaction reporting requirement under this 
chapter. 
(d) knowingly accepts or receives property which is represented to 
be proceeds of unlawful activity, (emphasis added) 
The trial transcript reflects, unequivocally, that Mr. Walker was forced 
into a surety situation without his knowledge, or consent, by the victim himself. 
[R. 489, p. 105, 106,11. 1] Furthermore, at the time the victim transferred funds 
into Mr. Walker's trust account, he (Mr. Walker) had no idea of the fraudulent 
nature of the investment. 
In United States v. Korolkov 870 F. Supp. 60, the Court said that "the 
elements and nature of the crime" are not satisfied where funds simply pass 
through a city in the course of a wire transfer. None of the elements of wire 
fraud "is alleged to have occurred in [a] district where defendants are not alleged 
to have "transmitted anything, or caused the transmission, from [that district]", 
and where the district in question is not the "place of initiating [the wire] 
transmission." 
More significantly, the case of United States v. Bezmalinovic 962 F. Supp. 
435, where funds passed through an interim bank, the Court said: "The crediting 
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and debiting that occurred in the Manhattan were purely ministerial acts that did 
not involve any decision making". (Emphasis added) 
According to the testimony at trial, it was someone other than Mr. Walker 
who directed that funds pass through his account and, upon learning that funds 
were deposited, Mr. Walker's act was simply to transfer them out, as instructed 
by the victim. [R. Exhibit 1 and Exhibit 2] 
There is nothing in the record to indicate that Lee Walker acted as 
anything other than an innocent grantor of an individual personal reference; 
certainly no evidence incriminating him as the originator of the 
"Memorandum(s) of Understanding". [R.489 p.55 11. 10 -25, p.5611. 1-18] 
Only Hatch's statement that walker faxed it to him. There is no evidence 
showing that he acted as a prognosticator for whatever investments transpired in 
this case. 
In the five to eight minute phone conversation, the sole communication 
between Walker, Sorenson and Hatch, Walker was not the subject of the verbal 
exchange, nor was the "Memorandum", nor the transaction outlined or proposed 
therein. Rather, David Smith was the sole subject of that conversation. In that 
conversation, Walker merely served as a character reference for David Smith, a 
person whom he'd come to respect through his admitted limited 
acquaintanceship. [R.489 p.56 11. 25, p.57 11.1-6; p. p. 102,103,11. 1-14,109,11. 
18-24, p. 112,11. 9-25, p. 113,11. 1-22.] [R. 488p.l57 11. 12-15; p. 174 11. 6-25, 
p.175 11.1-6; p.204 11. 24-25, p. 205 11. 1-5; p.20811.1-21; p.209 11. 21-25, 
p.21011. 3] This reference was not given in a formal, or business context, but in 
a loose, casual, social capacity. It may be important to note that Walker never 
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received any personal remuneration for his reference, nor could he have known 
that he could be considered to be acting in any official capacity. 
A country club membership would have required far more information 
than was solicited from Walker. In fact, Sorenson's memory that Hatch had 
spoken of Walker as a good sort of fellow, who "paid his chiropractic bills on 
time", - says it all. Especially when that was all it took, in Sorenson's words, to 
make it a sweet, safe, deal. The real responsibility for the weight of Sorenson's 
reference rests completely between Lance Hatch and Dr. Sorenson. 
During that singular phone conversation, Walker could have had no 
foreknowledge that his account would later be used for the transfer of funds. It 
was Hatch's idea to use his account to "...keep the pressure on him (Walker)," 
by Hatch's own later words, to make sure things went right At that time, 
Walker was not a player in the transaction between Sorenson, Hatch, and David 
Smith, nor did he ever truly become one. The record does not provide evidence 
that Walker ever profited, benefited, or schemed to profit, from the transaction. 
Only his trust account, acting in a passive manner, as in that of a temporary 
repository, could be construed as a point of evolution upon the money trail. 
Walker never gave his account number to Sorenson for the transfer of funds 
therein, and he only transferred funds therefrom at Sorenson's behest. 
By Sorenson's own, final testimony, Lee Walker's representation to him 
was limited to Walker's experience as an acquaintance and attorney of David 
Smith. Therefore, Walker had no more duty to disclose, volunteer, or divulge 
personal information about himself than if he'd participated in a conversation 
with telemarketers. No attorney / client relationship ever existed between 
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Sorenson and Walker. The only client relationship existing was that between 
Lance Hatch, prime promulgator, and Dr. Sorenson; and that was an investment 
advisor / investor relationship. Therefore, no unlawful acts, in the context of 
Utah Code, relating to investment advisory and fraud, were committed by Lee 
Walker. Walker isn't shown to have had any interest in whether that security 
was sold or not. He didn't contrive it, he didn't offer it, he didn't sign it, and he 
didn't engage Hatch to go sell it, for his own interests, according to the 
testimony in this case. There's no evidence at all that he authorized Hatch to do 
anything. 
Dr. Sorenson, under cross-examination by Mr. Scarth, [beginning R.489, 
p. 101,11.1], makes it clear that the singular subject of his only conversation, an 
five to eight minute phone conversation, was David Smith and Smith's 
credibility. [R. 489, p. 102,11. 1-15, p. 103,11. 1-14, p. 113,11. 1-22] 
Dr. Sorenson further testifies that he had always assumed that Lee Walker 
never got a penny of his money and that Walker's trust account was never more 
than a mere stopover point for his money on its way to its destination, as 
designated in the Memorandums of Understanding. [R. 489, p. 103,11. 15-25, 
p.104,11. 1-25, p.105,11. 1-25, p. 106,11. 1-5] 
Dr. Sorenson goes on to expose his lack of specific memory, as to who 
represented what, in contradiction of his earlier testimony. [R. 489, p. 106,11.6-
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25, p. 107,11. 1-25, p. 108,11. 1-15] Despite lack of memory, he admits Lee 
Walker was never a source of information on the investment. 
Again, contradicting prior testimony, Dr. Sorenson admits that Lee 
Walker's conversation with him brought no weight to bear on his decision to 
invest. Rather, it was his conversation with David Smith that did so. [R. 489, p. 
109,11. 18-24, p.l 12,11. 9-25] 
Sorenson's testimony inevitably shows that he'd seen proof that Walker 
had only forwarded funds from his trust account, exactly as the Memorandum of 
Understand had prescribed, exactly as Dr. Sorenson had desired. Sorenson 
indicates that he knew that Walker's limited participation in the travel of the 
money had not ever been necessary, but that Walker had been brought into this 
facet of the deal at Lance Hatch's urging, motivated by the desire to keep as 
many people involved, and therefore responsible, as possible. [R. 489, p. 116, 
11. 14-25, p. 117,11. 1-25, p. 118,11.1-25, p. 119,11. 1-14] This all raises the 
question, in this transaction, can Lee Walker be considered anything other than 
just another victim? 
ARGUMENT ISSUE NO. 3 
PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT OCCURRED IN THE 
PRESENCE OF THE JURY AND DURING THE TRIAL WHEN: 
a. the lead prosecutor asked Marc Sorenson whether Mr. 
Walker had told him whether he had ever been convicted of a 
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felony when the prosecutor knew there had been no 
conviction; 
b. the prosecutor argued the Defendant's previous conviction, 
permanent injunction, and sentence to prison, to show that 
Lee Walker was a bad person, and therefore, guilty of the 
crimes charged herein; information concerning those items 
had been admitted into evidence for the sole purpose of 
establishing an element of securities fraud; [R.495, p.48,11. 
23-25, p.49,11.1-3] 
c. during closing argument, the lead prosecutor told the Jury 
that Defendant / Appellant, Lee Walker, had been sentenced 
to prison, a fact not in evidence. [R. 495, p49,11. 2-3] 
PENNY C. ABBOTT, COURT REPORTER [R. 489] starting at page PAGE 91 
(Judge G. Rand Beacham, speaking regarding questions of witnesses 
which introduced Defendants criminal background by prosecutor.) 
1 question is what was it and then we go on to the 
2 other questions. 
3 It is prejudicial. I donft think it's so 
4 prejudicial that that outweighs the probative value 
5 because it relates to an element. I think there 
6 are a couple of limits that need to be placed on it 
7 though, however, at this point. First of all, 
8 considering that we are early on in the evidence 
9 the questioning can be did the defendant say 
10 whether he had ever had any difficulty with the 
11 Securities and Exchange Commission or something 
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12 alpng those lines. Did the defendant say whether 
13 he had ever been convicted of an offense of this 
14 nature. The answers, the witness's answers we 
15 expect will be in the negative. At this point I 
16 think it would be allowing the prosecution to 
17 testify if the questions were did, did the 
18 defendant state that he was convicted of this 
19 specific offense in this court on this date. In 
20 other words, those are things that weren't 
21 disclosed. And so the fact that this, the 
22 testimony that this witness needs to get out is he 
23 wasn't told anything about the subject, period. 
24 The evidence, direct evidence to show that those 
25 facts existed can come in later through other 
PENNY C. ABBOTT, COURT REPORTER [R.489] PAGE 91 
1 means. But at this point I think the questioning 
2 should be limited to did the defendant say whether 
3 rather than did the defendant say that. 
4 In addition, I will give limiting 
5 instructions on at least a couple of things and 
6 perhaps another if, if I can get a chance to look 
7 at some of your authorities on the reliance issues 
8 and I'll let you know on that. 
PENNY C. ABBOTT, COURT REPORTER [R. 489] PAGE 92 
1 but that's, that's what we were talking about this 
2 morning is to have this duty instruction. 
3 THE JUDGE: Right. Right. Okay. 
4 Let's see if we can get that covered then. Any 
5 question then about what I've decided on that? 
Walker Brief Page 35 of 48 
" 1 A A 1 A A 1 ~% i^ A 
6 MR. BARBER: So if I understand it: the 
7 form of the question w]11 be did he tell you 
8 anything as I i » I1«• t 11< • j h e 1 1 . M 1 . 
• 9 THE JUDGE: Rjght, - that, i s that 
something you can deal with, Mr Wayment? 
I IR VIA Y! IENT I. I 1 .1 i 1 J .£ i 
THE J t JDGE: Okay. A l l r i g h t : . 
PENNY C . A B B O T T , COURT REPORTER | 1<" 4 H ' i | PAGE 9 4 
8 
9 conversat ions w: ' : : . : rtd-M\ ut-^s you nad 
on*- <":onversation . v our conversat ic: . wi t h 
* merit a i a 
M. Mike: sa^ whutiit. ..t L : *.j .i L'.-en in prison? 
MR WAYMENT: • i(\ Wa 1** • say whether 
hii hii i d < "f r h e i i Hi •' I > . e l « . 
1 6 ' " I I I W T T T I K S " Hi i . 
II ; M; ICARIH; Objection, Your Honor. May 
18 we approarr, ' 
] 9 THE • JUDGE: O k a y . 
2 0 ( S i d€ Ba i: d:i s cus, : "<: J 3 c \ ;: s i ) 
211 MP SCARTH: That's a misdemeanor 
22 convic11on ar ; * < * • impJ ying through his question 
23 t : the j I i r ;y t: t 1 1 f s beei I convicted of a 
2 4 felony , How >.: wt overcome that ? 
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25 THE JUDGE: Well, the evidence will be 
PENNY C. ABBOTT, COURT REPORTER [R.489] PAGE 
1 what it is. I agree it's unfortunate it was asked 
MR. SCARTH: Well, for the record I move 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
that way. 
 
for a mistrial if t; 
that question. 
THE JUDGE: 
didn't he? 
MR. SCARTH 
THE JUDGE: 
MR. SCARTH 
so move. 
THE JUDGE: 
I think he already did, 
I think h e — Maybe he did. 
I think he did. 
It is for the record but I 
I understand. 
21 (End of side bar discussion) 
22 MR. SCARTH: I would like to state that 
23 the question assumed facts not in evidence, Your 
24 Honor. The question being was he informed of my 
25 client being convicted of a felony. There's no 
PENNY C. ABBOTT, COURT REPORTER [R.489] PAGE 
1 evidence before the Court of that. 
2 THE JUDGE: Well the question was--
3 That's correct. The question was whether there 
4 was anything disclosed of that nature. There is 
5 no evidence whether there was anything of that 
6 nature to disclose at this point. 
7 MR. SCARTH: Thank you 
8 MR. WAYMENT: Okay. Did Mr. Walker 
9 indicate whether he had ever been convicted of a 
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] 0 crime of any kind? 
1 ] THE WITNESS; No, he cij ci not. 
] 2 MR. WAYMENn "" • H Mr. Walker 
1 3 indicate one way oi * ».»* * ..: • t: 1 HE had ever 
3 I been the subject r£ J j-ermanent ; ri j -nction? 
1 5 THE WITNESS: No. 
] 6 ) " * /hat 'i I'IE re "' 1 
II 1 about the expei Ltisa .. ',nt_
 t i-ople- What w 
1 ilkf-r L<-1. .- i ^lcie y-i. invested about the 
] ' -perience ot t* ^  ; , e nanai i.ng your money in 
2 0 this investment ? 
PENNY C. ABBOTT, COURT REPORTER [R.4 89] PAGE 98 
At hand is the matter of how a question was asked of the witness, by the 
in in III i rmation about his earlier misadventures in the presentation, or 
repre •• w ei e take to tli s Defendant's deti ime nt 
'fe framing w questions by =: ci it oi ' I his occurred numerous times, in 
dif foi : te d to. ' \ hen Sorenson was asked if 
\A aitker had e v er told him that he (Walker) had been convicted of a fcloi i> : a 
completely misleading question, as Walker had never been convicted — -•* 
^ HVM . u ions :i the \ \a\ it was p o ^ 1 
;ecl where tne prosecutors remau * 
c ef!cv» v\lk-i IK deenk ' *\> 
^ (Utah 19c>2)(re 
i y " iilikiii i i n i ' f Pago IKoi -IK 
considering in reaching a verdict and the remarks were harmful). Also see State 
v. Pearson, 943 P.2d 1347 (Utah 1997). 
That assessment, by the judge, fully indicted the error, and should have 
obligated the Court to grant a mistrial. [R. 489 p.98 11. 3-12] 
But, more importantly, the question remains of whether Walker ever had 
any duty to disclose, at all, in any form. By the prosecutor's own words, and 
Sorenson's testimony, there was only ever one conversation between Walker 
and Sorenson; a phone conversation. [R. 489 p.94 11. 8-13] The sole subject of 
that conversation was not the consideration of any kind of securities, or any 
kind of deal. Rather, that subject matter was limited to Walker's experience 
with David Smith. Nor was this a formal endorsement of Smith's character, but 
a simple reference based upon social dealings and common knowledge. 
Consequently, there was truly no duty, on the part of Walker, to disclose any 
kind of personal information, because neither he, nor the transaction, was ever 
the subject of the conversation. Emmett infra. 
In fact, it was Lance Hatch who had busied himself with representations 
regarding the deal, and it was Lance Hatch who had a duty to disclose anything 
about himself. 
Therefore, the matter at hand is not merely of how the question was asked 
of the witness, but should it have been asked at all. The question, in any form, is 
based upon the false premise that Walker was representing securities, which he 
was not, and therefore, had no such a duty to disclose. Short of being a felon, 
which he was not, Walker had no obligation to bare his history, or his soul; none 
whatsoever. The Court, however, had a duty to right, or at to least attempt to 
reverse, the wrongs imposed upon Walker by the prosecutor's misconduct. 
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ARGUMENT ISSUE NO. 4 
JURY INSTRUCTION NO. 13 G DID NOT PROVIDE FOR JURY 
UNANIMITY ON AN ELEMENT OF THE CRIME OF SECURITIES 
FRAUD AND THUS INVITED THE JURY TO COMMM ERRUR. 
*3Gisprot 1" 
i ou are instructed that, while a number of 
representations and omissions are alleged as the basis 
for the charge of securities fraud, it is not incumbent 
upon the state to prove each and every one of them. It 
is enough that the state prove, beyond a reasonable 
doubt, that a false statement, or material omission, was 
made in connection with the offer or sale of the 
security. 
Tlieix %a- no safeguard in the inannei in uhich the iurv was instructed to 
i L ' V * *sentation(>», ox 
- eonstnuie ^ enmmal violatu ^ «n> uu.-. > , M*can^  more than 
iprcruv:v<> ^-:» the defendant has * m o-tosiion. 
a J> a requirement of subsume.u agreement as to the piinupal latliial 
'* underlying a specified offense. I TnitedStates v. Duncan, 850 h 2d 
110* 
1987); I *?:/. (npson \ ^ 1^  2d 45* 4 ^ 4 ^ * L A 5 197' • i \ 
manimo *edj\\i .M* en*v?W discarded, 
bi it it does require unanimous agieeineni as to ihe nature of ilk uwicnu^n • 
vimilrilion, n .n simpls the fact that a violation has occurred. 
In State v. Russel, 733 P,2d 162 (Utah 1987), the Ulali Supreme Court affirmed 
:i second-degiee inuidei ion /ii/lion, alllu 11;.»II Ihe Inal eourl had refused to 
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instruct the jury that there must be unanimous agreement on which of three 
alternative mens rea the defendant possessed; i.e., intent to kill, intent to cause 
serious bodily injury, or "depraved indifference". State v. Dykes 789 P.2d 
1082 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1990) 
In the instant case, we are concerned with the breach, or what the 
defendant did which constituted the breach; the jury is not disagreeing on which 
alternate mens rea the defendant possessed. Rather, the jury was allowed to 
disagree on what Mr. Walker did, or did not do, and still find him guilty. 
The rule set out in Russel has application only where a statute provides 
various modes by which a specific wrong may be accomplished. See generally, 
Annotation: Jury Unanimity-Mode of Offense, 75 A.L.R.4th 91. It does not 
apply where the prosecution relies on alternative "wrongs" to prove a single 
offense, or a single element, of an offense. See Woertman v. People, 804 P.2d 
188 (Cob. 1991); Covington v. State, 703 P.2d 436 (Alaska App. 1985). 
Consider Justice Stewart's observations in State v. Tillman, 750 P.2d 546 (Utah 
1987, 585-88 (Durham, J., concurring and dissenting), Id. at 591 (Zimmerman, 
J., concurring and dissenting); Id. at 5 77-80 (Stewart, J., concurring in the 
result). 
The importance of preserving the principle of jury unanimity, as to all 
"elements of offense", can hardly be overstated. To dilute that principle by 
allowing jurors to disagree among themselves as to separate, alternative 
elements of the crime, even though they agree on the general conclusion that the 
crime has, in fact, been committed, is to lose the value of the synergistic effect 
of jurors acting as a group in reconstructing the facts and applying the law. 
Non-unanimity permits a jury to refrain from coming to grips with determining 
Walker Brief Page 41 of 48 
^ A A I A A 1 "» i^ A 
. . . . .:. d.s that del s of the crime. 
unanimity, as to alternative elements of a crime, can a.s,. vk ,a \ v-e a 
defendant o* - • v??nse to the charge A. defendant urges a defense that i^  \ aiid 
as to one aiiciiiaii a elleiii .Mil l nt mil In another, imci I he iiiiv spills nil 
e IIII in "i III T I r ml in e 1 he ile inn I; 1111 e in mil tod (In1 IMP ' i". m I (breed to deride I lie 
II II in 11 nil) of I lie i led* use . . . . . . . 
Finally, if the principle of jury unanimity is , 
ii, 1ii\ed, all the vaunted protections of proof, beyond a 
reasonable doubt, will be threatened Requiring jury 
unanimity, as to the crime itself only, rather than each 
element of the crime, would permit a jury to render 
inconsistent, and potentially irrational, verdicts 
because they may be based on conflicting, and even 
inconsistent, determinations of the facts. That is no 
small erosion of a fundamental principle of our 
criminal justice system. Id. at 578. State v. Saundeis. 
slip op. No. 950295 (Utah June 11, 1999) Instruction 
informing jury that "there is no requirement that the 
jurors be unanimous about precisely which act 
occurred, or when or where the act or acts occurred", 
was plain and harmful error. 
tu v. ientiL\\, 913 p#2d 7:H- » 
* inanimity is necessary as tr .-M 
• sotirig State v. Saundet -
 7 
1995) State v. Russell, 733 P.^d 162 
7) (although all elements of a crime must be 
•ush. this does not mean that the jury 
i mi a single view of the transaction if a 
conclusion ma* he justified upon either of two 
i>11 lie evidence; verdict cannot be 
i/v showing that jury split on the 
_.*MIS M r+K stati ite i inder which the • 
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defendant is convicted actually defines more than one 
crime, and not merely one crime which may be 
committed in several different ways, the defendant is 
entitled to jury unanimity on which crime he is guilty 
of committing." 
With no unanimity instruction, a real recipe for judicial mischief stands 
poised to contaminate the judicial process. The jury is likely to reach a guilty 
verdict based upon a conglomeration of divergent opinions as to the nature of 
the defendant's guilt. 
For instance, in the instant case, one juror might have felt Walker was 
guilty of ignorance, by his having vested his trust in David Smith. A second 
juror might have found Walker guilty of cavalier management of his trust 
account. A third might have assumed his guilt due to misstatements by the 
prosecutor to effect that Walker was a convicted felon. Taken to the extreme, 
still another juror, based upon his reaction to Walker's appearance, might reach 
a certainty of Walker's guilt simply because, to him, Walker had the look and 
attitude of a philanderer. 
A equals a; guilt is guilt. Come the vote, a guilty verdict is reached upon 
the wave of a single, slender tliread of unanimity; they all agree that they believe 
Walker is guilty of something. But, if asked, they just could not agree upon 
what. 
ARGUMENT ISSUE NO. 5 
THERE WAS ERROR IN THE METHOD USED IN SELECTING AND 
SEATING THE JURY AND THE ALTERNATE. 
There was error in the "disqualification" of juror no. 6. 
Trial courts are responsible for safeguarding a defendant's constitutional 
right to an impartial jury. Stale v. Woolley, 810 P.2d 440,442 (Utah App.), cert, 
denied, 826 P.2d 651 (Utah 1991). A defendant has the right to have voir dire 
questions posed which will "assist counsel in the intelligent use of peremptory 
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p i u s p e c t i v e j u r o r s " 
Il Il Il  II I l l Ill I S 1 • ' • • • ! * 
substituted the alternate, who h;*.' . ven seated as JUKM N,» * 5 
dMnulnnl \ i n •< i and snecific objection lo tins process. |R. -r^ v,
 F F . 
567,568] 
i IIIIIII I,1 l l ic p a n e l is s c a l e d , l l ic . i iu i h n u l l e d i inl'i lln i n l n < 1*111111' i l l n e s s 
Jiir1 i lnl i l v o r o t h e r d i s q u a l i f i c a t i o n o f o n e o f i ts m e m b e r s w i l l r e s u l t in t h e 
a l t e r a I no in I ill i i n p n . i i l i n n S r 1 III ill I^1" l 'I'll IIII III" I  11111 III mil ninK iill  lllliii 
o c i u f s w i l l t h e a l t e r n a t e paili i , iii|  iiiii1 IIIIIII Il hbeialious 
If is hv\ I "| i i '.linn Ilial Jtmii No "J"1 i as an ahnnalc Knk IX|g) slalts 
in relevant pjit. 
'ternate JUM :s5 in the rtic ir which they are called, shall replace jurors 
.<*i ./r* *-v •- MT duties," Emphasis 
added Eve: UK>W U \ I . unultaneouslx >ea;- iry and 
• i^ alternate, and nuiwii - * - -'\"v :v*\ ^ *m a on the part of the Defendant 
^
rning the number oi peremi
 M > i, .nnienges lit1 was ..illoninl (li " 
ant was entitled to the verdict of the duly-qualified jury, as seated 
^ "c a juror's obligation, and right to serve, is, in part, a function of 
r ich they are called," the Defendant exercised the peremptories 
,. - d v. tx »u cd with the expeclal i< mi thai, 1 >ai i my some iiiilorehct 
events the *W eit'ht veniremen seated would be his jury Thai expectation was 
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The Defendant does not suggest that the Court acted with improper 
motive in "disqualifying" Juror No. 6. However, the removal of the juror was 
improper, even if strictly random. The parties are entitled to the verdict of the 
jury they jointly selected. The rules deny the Court any right, or power, to 
arbitrarily, or randomly, skew the selection process. The Court's selection and 
"disqualification" of Juror No. 6 was in error and in contradiction to due process 
of law. 
The jury is seated before it hears one word of testimony or argument, 
indeed, before it hears the language of the formal accusation. To allow a Court 
the power to "peremptorily" remove a member of the panel, after observing him 
or her throughout the trial, would create a significant potential for abuse. 
In selecting an eight-member jury in criminal proceedings, the state and 
the Defendant are each entitled to peremptorily strike four qualified veniremen. 
See Utah R. Crim. P. 18(d). Sixteen veniremen are qualified and pass for cause 
before the first peremptory challenge is made. See Utah R. Crim. P. 18(a), (t). 
This means that all those who ultimately serve on the jury are identified when 
the first peremptory is spent. 
Typically, there are one or more members of the qualified panel with 
whom neither party is particularly "comfortable" and who both parties have 
earmarked to be stricken. Although it is usually quite obvious who these 
veniremen are, experienced counsel will not use an early challenge to strike one 
of them, hoping that opposing counsel will spend one of his peremptories in 
eliminating the "unattractive" panel member. This is a waiting game which the 
state's prosecutor will ordinarily lose because the challenges are made 
alternatively; the state exercises the first challenge, and the defendant enjoys the 
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').!- he abihtv to substantias! • ' *\x his uirv ivca ise uc may strike twent\-iive 
perCCL i . ^ ' U.*r\t .-; -* tMSOll 
uk-tsoever ' ^ / practi r, theDc z*\\ can viiectivei> strike <i. ,f 
ed nane * r \ incal case. It is often said that 
this is how "'triable jawsmis die \w 
p inrv 1 
diern.r «M * See Utah K Cnm. P. 18(g). n u at process, UK. 
i peremptory for e ;v 
.i li n (ud See Id. 
In the instant case, me Court qi . :u . i s . . . ., , 
to qualify, in a single procedure • * ospective jurors to allow ca, M party 
to peremptoiil) stiikx 1'IVI 
Howcvei each part\ was ultimately allowed ,wu ^n^s • ins 
(iiiK't'iss impuiiii'vabl' I! in I, i mi In I I Vltiidiiiill 11 I'll I In SJliiil r llu1 lliiiiv. 
CONCLUSION 
i ;
' i result WIUMI ilk? up|K>l|;jii' 
court s confidence '•; :i. -crciiu is uiniv- d. Strickland v. Washington, 4(>6 
'<•' ^1^8 H 984' Muccv. Knighi ,„4 P.2d913, 919-
ijtah IV8 » 
Whc- • v""*"M: to consider the evidence and the verdict in this case, in 
flu uuiii H«.-^ idvo.ubie to the jury, one can sec liou III.' |in v ini/'lil li.ivr rr;i« lied 
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its verdict in error. By the sheer volume of earlier testimony, from different 
sources, as to Lee Walker's culpability, one can hardly fault the jury for the 
dominating weight it gave to that negative testimony. To be hammered, 
consistently, with such negative information overload, only to overlook what 
constituted its reversal, as reflected in the few pages of Mr. Scarth's cross-
examination of Dr. Sorenson, would create error. And that is human. 
One must also take into account the false premise of Walker's alleged 
representation of securities, as offered by the State, without v/hich, there was no 
duty, by Walker, to disclose any past information about himself. 
Then, the prosecutorial misconduct in portraying Walker as a convicted 
felon must be taken into consideration. The jury had to assume Walker's guilt 
by that misinformation alone. 
Additionally, without a unanimity instruction, the stage was set for a 
guilty verdict resulting from the confusion accruing from all the factors above. 
As mentioned, the jury, through simple human nature, had to be convinced that 
Walker had to be guilty of something. On that part at least, they were obviously 
unanimous. 
In reviewing the record and matters covered in Issues No. 2 and 3, one 
can see that Dr. Sorenson's testimony brings into question Lee Walker's 
participation in anything more than a character referral during the single phone 
conversation he had with Dr. Sorenson. There is no evidence that Lee Walker 
was representing any security, or any kind of deal; this renders the matter of his 
alleged failure to disclose completely moot. The Defense, therefore, prays that 
this Court reverse the findings of the lower Court and dismiss the charges 
against Lee Walker. 
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ADDENDUM 
State of Utah v. Lee Walker 
Case No. 20010012-CA 
Addendum 
ADD I 
Brief addendum 
page# page# 
Utan <^ ode Ann. § 76-3-402, 10 
Utah Code Ann. §76-3-402(3) 1-5-6-48 
United States Constitution, Fourteenth Amendment 4-5 __ _ 
Utah Constitution article I, sections 7 and 2-1 
Section 10 (b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 
,ts
 ' 78 j (b)J Rule 10I>-5|I7< AM. 8 2 I0.10b-5I 6 
S U I S 
(f). S-4G 6-9 
Utah R. Crim. P. 18(a), (t) 5-45. 
Utah R. Crim. P. 18(d) 5-45 
Utah R. Crim. P. 18(g) 4-5-4<> 47 
amended). 5-6-7 n 
J 
1 
Rule 17. The trial. 
(a) In all cases the defendant shall have the right to appear and defend 
in person and by counsel. The defendant shall be personally present at 
the trial with the following exceptions: 
(1) In prosecutions of misdemeanors and infractions, defendant may 
consent in writing to trial in his absence; 
(2) In prosecutions for offenses not punishable by death, the defendant's 
voluntary absence from the trial after notice to defendant of the time for 
trial shall not prevent the case from being tried and a verdict or judgment 
entered therein shall have the same effect as if defendant had been 
present; and 
(3) The court may exclude or excuse a defendant from trial for good 
cause shown which may include tumultuous, riotous, or obstreperous 
conduct. 
Upon application of the prosecution, the court may require the personal 
attendance of the defendant at the trial. 
(b) Cases shall be set on the trial calendar to be tried in the following 
order: 
(1) misdemeanor cases when defendant is in custody; 
(2) felony cases when defendant is in custody; 
(3) felony cases when defendant is on bail or recognizance; and 
(4) misdemeanor cases when defendant is on bail or recognizance. 
(c) All felony cases shall be tried by jury unless the defendant waives a 
jury in open court with the approval of the court and the consent of the 
prosecution. 
2 
(d) All other cases shall be tried without a jury unless the defendant 
makes written demand at least ten days prior to trial, or the court orders 
otherwise. No jury shall be allowed in the trial of an infraction. 
(e) In all cases, the number of members of a trial jury shall be as 
specified in Section 78-46-5, U.C.A. 1953. 
(0 In all cases the prosecution and defense may, with the consent of the 
accused and the approval of the court, by stipulation in writing or made 
orally in open court, proceed to trial or complete a trial then in progress 
with any number of jurors less than otherwise required. 
(g) After the jury has been impanelled and sworn, the trial shall proceed 
in the following order: 
(1) The charge shall be read and the plea of the defendant stated; 
(2) The prosecuting attorney may make an opening statement and the 
defense may make an opening statement or reserve it until the 
prosecution has rested; 
(3) The prosecution shall offer evidence in support of the charge; 
(4) When the prosecution has rested, the defense may present its case; 
(5) Thereafter, the parties may offer only rebutting evidence unless the 
court, for good cause, otherwise permits; 
(6) When the evidence is concluded and at any other appropriate time, 
the court shall instruct the jury; and 
(7) Unless the cause is submitted to the jury on either side or on both 
sides without argument, the prosecution shall open the argument, the 
defense shall follow and the prosecution may close by responding to the 
defense argument. The court may set reasonable limits upon the 
argument of counsel for each party and the time to be allowed for 
argument. 
(h) If a juror becomes ill, disabled or disqualified during trial and an 
alternate juror has been selected, the case shall proceed using the 
alternate juror. If no alternate has been selected, the parties may 
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stipulate to proceed with the number of jurors remaining. Otherwise, the 
jury shall be discharged and a new trial ordered. 
(i) When in the opinion of the court it is proper for the jury to view the 
place in which the offense is alleged to have been committed, or in which 
any other material fact occurred, it may order them to be conducted in a 
body under the charge of an officer to the place, which shall be shown to 
them by some person appointed by the court for that purpose. The officer 
shall be sworn that while the jury are thus conducted, he will suffer no 
person other than the person so appointed to speak to them nor to do so 
himself on any subject connected with the trial and to return them into 
court without unnecessary delay or at a specified time. 
(j) At each recess of the court, whether the jurors are permitted to 
separate or are sequestered, they shall be admonished by the court that 
it is their duty not to converse among themselves or to converse with, or 
suffer themselves to be addressed by, any other person on any subject 
of the trial, and that it is their duty not to form or express an opinion 
thereon until the case is finally submitted to them. 
(k) Upon retiring for deliberation, the jury may take with them the 
instructions of the court and all exhibits and papers which have been 
received as evidence, except depositions; and each juror may also take 
with him any notes of the testimony or other proceedings taken by 
himself, but none taken by any other person. 
(I) When the case is finally submitted to the jury, they shall be kept 
together in some convenient place under charge of an officer until they 
agree upon a verdict or are discharged, unless otherwise ordered by the 
court. Except by order of the court, the officer having them under his 
charge shall not allow any communication to be made to them, or make 
any himself, except to ask them if they have agreed upon their verdict, 
and he shall not, before the verdict is rendered, communicate to any 
person the state of their deliberations or the verdict agreed upon. 
(m) After the jury has retired for deliberation, if they desire to be informed 
on any point of law arising in the cause, they shall inform the officer in 
charge of them, who shall communicate such request to the court. The 
court may then direct that the jury be brought before the court where, in 
the presence of the defendant and both counsel, the court shall respond 
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to the inquiry or advise the jury that no further instructions shall be given. 
Such response shall be recorded. The court may in its discretion respond 
to the inquiry in writing without having the jury brought before the court, 
in which case the inquiry and the response thereto shall be entered in 
the record. 
(n) If the verdict rendered by a jury is incorrect on its face, it may be 
corrected by the jury under the advice of the court, or the jury may be 
sent out again. 
(o) At the conclusion of the evidence by the prosecution, or at the 
conclusion of all the evidence, the court may issue an order dismissing 
any information or indictment, or any count thereof, upon the ground that 
the evidence is not legally sufficient to establish the offense charged 
therein or any lesser included offense. 
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Rule 18. Selection of jury. 
(a) The clerk shall draw by lot and call the number of the jurors that are 
to try the cause plus such an additional number as will allow for all 
peremptory challenges permitted. After each challenge for cause 
sustained, another juror shall be called to fill the vacancy before further 
challenges are made, and any such new juror may be challenged for 
cause. When the challenges for cause are completed, the clerk shall 
make a list of the jurors remaining, and each side, beginning with the 
prosecution, shall indicate thereon its peremptory challenge to one juror 
at a time in regular turn, as the court may direct, until all peremptory 
challenges are exhausted or waived. The clerk shall then call the 
remaining jurors, or so many of them as shall be necessary to constitute 
the jury, in the order in which they appear on the list, and the persons 
whose names are so called shall constitute the jury. 
(b) The court may permit counsel or the defendant to conduct the 
examination of the prospective jurors or may itself conduct the 
examination. In the latter event, the court may permit counsel or the 
defendant to supplement the examination by such further inquiry as it 
deems proper, or may itself submit to the prospective jurors additional 
questions requested by counsel or the defendant. 
(c) A challenge may be made to the panel or to an individual juror. 
(1) The panel is a list of jurors called to serve at a particular court or for 
the trial of a particular action. A challenge to the panel is an objection 
made to all jurors summoned and may be taken by either party. 
(i) A challenge to the panel can be founded only on a material departure 
from the procedure prescribed with respect to the selection, drawing, 
summoning and return of the panel. 
(ii) The challenge to the panel shall be taken before the jury is sworn and 
shall be in writing or recorded by the reporter. It shall specifically set forth 
the facts constituting the grounds of the challenge. 
(iii) If a challenge to the panel is opposed by the adverse party, a hearing 
may be had to try any question of fact upon which the challenge is 
based. The jurors challenged, and any other persons, may be called as 
witnesses at the hearing thereon. 
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(iv) The court shall decide the challenge. If the challenge to the panel is 
allowed, the court shall discharge the jury so far as the trial in question is 
concerned. If a challenge is denied, the court shall direct the selection of 
jurors to proceed. 
(2) A challenge to an individual juror may be either peremptory or for 
cause. A challenge to an individual juror may be made only before the 
jury is sworn to try the action, except the court may, for good cause, 
permit it to be made after the juror is sworn but before any of the 
evidence is presented. In challenges for cause the rules relating to 
challenges to a panel and hearings thereon shall apply. All challenges for 
cause shall be taken first by the prosecution and then by the defense. 
(d) A peremptory challenge is an objection to a juror for which no reason 
need be given. In capital cases, each side is entitled to 10 peremptory 
challenges. In other felony cases each side is entitled to four peremptory 
challenges. In misdemeanor cases, each side is entitled to three 
peremptory challenges. If there is more than one defendant the court 
may allow the defendants additional peremptory challenges and permit 
them to be exercised separately or jointly. 
(e) The challenge for cause is an objection to a particular juror and may 
be taken on one or more of the following grounds: 
(1) want of any of the qualifications prescribed by law; 
(2) any mental or physical infirmity which renders one incapable of 
performing the duties of a juror; 
(3) consanguinity or affinity within the fourth degree to the person alleged 
to be injured by the offense charged, or on whose complaint the 
prosecution was instituted; 
(4) the existence of any social, legal, business, fiduciary or other 
relationship between the prospective juror and any party, witness or 
person alleged to have been victimized or injured by the defendant, 
which relationship when viewed objectively, would suggest to reasonable 
minds that the prospective juror would be unable or unwilling to return a 
verdict which would be free of favoritism. A prospective juror shall not be 
disqualified solely because he is indebted to or employed by the state or 
a political subdivision thereof; 
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(5) having been or being the party adverse to the defendant in a civil 
action, or having complained against or having been accused by him in a 
criminal prosecution; 
(6) having served on the grand jury which found the indictment; 
(7) having served on a trial jury which has tried another person for the 
particular offense charged; 
(8) having been one of a jury formally sworn to try the same charge, and 
whose verdict was set aside, or which was discharged without a verdict 
after the case was submitted to it; 
(9) having served as a juror in a civil action brought against the 
defendant for the act charged as an offense; 
(10) if the offense charged is punishable with death, the entertaining of 
such conscientious opinions about the death penalty as would preclude 
the juror from voting to impose the death penalty following conviction 
regardless of the facts; 
(11) because he is or, within one year preceding, has been engaged or 
interested in carrying on any business, calling or employment, the 
carrying on of which is a violation of law, where defendant is charged 
with a like offense; 
(12) because he has been a witness, either for or against the defendant 
on the preliminary examination or before the grand jury; 
(13) having formed or expressed an unqualified opinion or belief as to 
whether the defendant is guilty or not guilty of the offense charged; or 
(14) that a state of mind exists on the part of the juror with reference to 
the cause, or to either party, which will prevent him from acting 
impartially and without prejudice to the substantial rights of the party 
challenging; but no person shall be disqualified as a juror by reason of 
having formed or expressed an opinion upon the matter or cause to be 
submitted to such jury, founded upon public rumor, statements in public 
journals or common notoriety, if it satisfactorily appears to the court that 
the juror can and will, notwithstanding such opinion, act impartially and 
fairly upon the matter to be submitted to him. 
8 
(f) Peremptory challenges shall be taken first by the prosecution and 
then by the defense alternately. Challenges for cause shall be completed 
before peremptory challenges are taken. 
(g) The court may direct that alternate jurors be impaneled. Alternate 
jurors, in the order in which they are called, shall replace jurors who are, 
or become, unable or disqualified to perform their duties. The 
prosecution and defense shall each have one additional peremptory 
challenge for each alternate juror to be chosen. 
Alternate jurors shall have the same qualifications, take the same oath 
and enjoy the same privileges as regular jurors. 
(h) A statutory exemption from service as a juror is a privilege of the 
person exempted and is not a ground for challenge for cause. 
(i) When the jury is selected an oath shall be administered to the jurors, 
in substance, that they and each of them will well and truly try the matter 
in issue between the parties, and render a true verdict according to the 
evidence and the instructions of the court. 
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76-3-402. Conviction of lower degree of offense. (1) If the court, 
having regard to the nature and circumstances of the offense of which 
the defendant was found guilty and to the history and character of the 
defendant, concludes it would be unduly harsh to record the conviction 
as being for that degree of offense established by statute and to 
sentence the defendant to an alternative normally applicable to that 
offense, the court may unless otherwise specifically provided by law 
enter a judgment of conviction for the next lower degree of offense and 
impose sentence accordingly. 
(2) If a conviction is for a third degree felony the conviction is 
considered to be for a class A misdemeanor if: 
(a) the judge designates the sentence to be for a class A 
misdemeanor and the sentence imposed is within the limits provided by 
law for a class A misdemeanor; or 
(b) (i) the imposition of the sentence is stayed and the defendant is 
placed on probation, whether committed to jail as a condition of 
probation or not; 
(ii) the defendant is subsequently discharged without violating his 
probation; and 
(iii) the judge upon motion and notice to the prosecuting attorney, and 
a hearing if requested by either party or the court, finds it is in the interest 
of justice that the conviction be considered to be for a class A 
misdemeanor. 
(3) An offense may be reduced only one degree under this section 
unless the prosecutor specifically agrees in writing or on the court record 
that the offense may be reduced two degrees. In no case may an offense 
be reduced under this section by more than two degrees. 
(4) This section may not be construed to preclude any person from 
obtaining or being granted an expungment of his record as provided by 
law. 
Amended by Chapter 7,1991 General Session 
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76-10-1903. Money laundering. 
(1) A person commits the offense of money laundering who: 
(a) transports, receives, or acquires the property which is in fact 
proceeds of the specified unlawful activity, knowing that the property 
involved represents the proceeds of some form of unlawful activity; 
(b) makes proceeds of unlawful activity available to another by 
transaction or transportation, or other means, knowing that it is intended 
to be used for the purpose of continuing or furthering the commission of 
specified unlawful activity; 
(c) conducts a transaction knowing the property involved in the 
transaction represents the proceeds of some form of unlawful activity 
with the intent: 
(i) to promote the unlawful activity; 
(ii) to conceal or disguise the nature, location, source, ownership, or 
control of the property; or 
(iii) to avoid a transaction reporting requirement under this chapter; or 
(d) knowingly accepts or receives property which is represented to be 
proceeds of unlawful activity. 
(2) Under Subsection (1)(d), knowledge that the property represents 
the proceeds of unlawful activity may be established by proof that a law 
enforcement officer or person acting at the request of a law enforcement 
officer made such representations and the person's subsequent 
statements or actions indicate that the person believed those 
representations to be true. 
Amended by Chapter 17,1996 General Session 
11 
61-1-21. Penalties for violations. 
(1) A person is guilty of a third degree felony who willfully violates any 
provision of this chapter except Sections 61-1-1 and 61-1-16, or who 
willfully violates any rule or order under this chapter, or who willfully 
violates Section 61-1-16 knowing the statement made to be false or 
misleading in any material respect. 
(2) A person who willfully violates Section 61-1-1: 
(a) is guilty of a third degree felony if, at the time the crime was 
committed, the property, money, or thing unlawfully obtained or sought to 
be obtained was worth less than $10,000; 
(b) is guilty of a second degree felony if: 
(i) at the time the crime was committed, the property, money, or thing 
unlawfully obtained or sought to be obtained was worth $10,000 or more; 
or 
(ii) (A) at the time the crime was committed, the property, money, or 
thing unlawfully obtained or sought to be obtained was worth less than 
$10,000; and 
(B) in connection with that violation, the violator knowingly accepted 
any money representing: 
(I) equity in a person's home; 
(II) a withdrawal from any individual retirement account; or 
(III) a withdrawal from any qualified retirement plan as defined in the 
Internal Revenue Code; or 
(c) is guilty of a second degree felony punishable by imprisonment for 
an indeterminate term of not less than three years or more than 15 years 
if: 
(i) at the time the crime was committed, the property, money, or thing 
unlawfully obtained or sought to be obtained was worth $10,000 or more; 
and 
(ii) in connection with that violation, the violator knowingly accepted 
any money representing: 
(A) equity in a person's home; 
(B) a withdrawal from any individual retirement account; or 
(C) a withdrawal from any qualified retirement plan as defined in the 
Internal Revenue Code. 
(3) No person may be imprisoned for the violation of any rule or order 
if he proves that he had no knowledge of the rule or order. 
(4) In addition to any other penalty for a criminal violation of this 
chapter, the sentencing judge may impose any penalty or remedy 
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provided for in Subsection 61-1-20(2)(b). 
Amended by Chapter 149, 2001 General Session 
Article I, Section 7. [Due process of law.] 
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property, without due 
process of law. 
No History for Constitution 
Article I, Section 25. [Rights retained by people.] 
This enumeration of rights shall not be construed to impair or deny 
others retained by the people. 
No History for Constitution 
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AMENDMENTS TO THE U.S. CONSTITUTION 
Amendment XIV 
(1868) 
Section 1. All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and 
subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of 
the state wherein they reside. No state shall make or enforce any law 
which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United 
States; nor shall any state deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, 
without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction 
the equal protection of the laws. 
Section 2. Representatives shall be apportioned among the several 
states according to their respective numbers, counting the whole number 
of persons in each state, excluding Indians not taxed. But when the right 
to vote at any election for the choice of electors for President and Vice 
President of the United States, Representatives in Congress, the 
executive and judicial officers of a state, or the members of the 
legislature thereof, is denied to any of the male inhabitants of such state, 
being twenty-one years of age, and citizens of the United States, or in 
any way abridged, except for participation in rebellion, or other crime, the 
basis of representation therein shall be reduced in the proportion which 
the number of such male citizens shall bear to the whole number of male 
citizens twenty-one years of age in such state. 
Section 3. No person shall be a Senator or Representative in Congress, 
or elector of President and Vice President, or hold any office, civil or 
military, under the United States, or under any state, who, having 
previously taken an oath, as a member of Congress, or as an officer of 
the United States, or as a member of any state legislature, or as an 
executive or judicial officer of any state, to support the Constitution of the 
United States, shall have engaged in insurrection or rebellion against the 
same, or given aid or comfort to the enemies thereof. But Congress may 
by a vote of two-thirds of each House, remove such disability. 
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Section 4. The validity of the public debt of the United States, authorized 
by law, including debts incurred for payment of pensions and bounties for 
services in suppressing insurrection or rebellion, shall not be questioned. 
But neither the United States nor any state shall assume or pay any debt 
or obligation incurred in aid of insurrection or rebellion against the United 
States, or any claim for the loss or emancipation of any slave; but all 
such debts, obligations and claims shall be held illegal and void. 
Section 5. The Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate 
legislation, the provisions of this article. 
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